U.S. Involvement

Mr. CHURCH, Mr. President, what has been America's involvement in these startling events? When did it begin? How should it be altered? For its savage crackdown on the Bengalis, the Pakistan Army used imported guns, automatic weapons, mortars, artillery trucks, armored personnel carriers, tanks, airplanes, and ammunition. The officers in charge were men trained in the United States or Great Britain. Most of the ordnance and supplies came from the United States, acquired over the years through our lavish grants of military assistance and subsidized arms sales programs. The Bengalis, on the other hand, have literally used bows and arrows, knives, rocks, homemade bombs and captured hand weapons to resist. Starting in 1954, when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles negotiated a large arms agreement with Pakistan the U.S. Government developed a special relationship with the ruling feudal oligarchy of West Pakistan P the generals, the handful of landowning families who control 80 percent of the wealth and the civil servants. We furnished immense quantities of arms, and more than \$4 billion worth of economic and food assistance the bulk of which was channeled into West Pakistan.

The military largesse, costing the United States nearly \$2 billion in arms, was perennially justified to Congress and the American people as a shield to protect the Pakistanis P and the United States P against Communist aggression. Pakistan joined Seato and Cento; in turn, the United States built a communications and air base complex at Peshawar to gather intelligence data from Central Asia. Far from containing the Russian bear or the Chinese dragon, however, Pakistan has used its American-furnished military equipment first against India in 1965 and now against its own people. Indeed, in 1968, Pakistan unabashedly closed down our electronic listening post in Peshawar in order to placate Russian and Chinese feelings. By all standards, then, our military assistance policy has proved a failure P but it has been kept alive by the persistence of our arms bureaucracy and the insistence of the Pakistan junta. In October 1970, the United States lifted its embargo on lethal arms to Pakistan that had been imposed after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. When this policy turnabout was announced, I warned in the senate, as I had in the early 1960's against fueling the Pakistan-Indian rivalry, that trouble and violence would be the end-product. "It could be," I said on October 14 of last year, "only a matter of time before recent history repeats itself and the United States is burned again." This has happened but in another, unforeseen way.

When a policy goes sour but is not changed the results are sordid. New public information reveals this about the Pakistan case. In April, 1967, the United States altered its embargo to ease military transactions. We permitted commercial sales of what could be termed "nonlethal end-items," and this was interpreted here and internationally as communications and transportation equipment. Now it has come to light that our sales to Pakistan were averaging \$10 million per year and of that amount, the State Department confessed a month ago, 2.5 million went for ammunition. Our arms purveyors reasoned that ammunition thought lethal was not an "end-item."

After hedging for more than a month, the State Department acknowledged on May 5 1971, that the Pakistan Government was using U.S. supplied tanks and jet fighters on imposing military rule upon the majority of its population which lives in East Pakistan. IN a recent letter that I have received from Dacca, an American

observer writes that the success of the Pakistan Army to date in occupying key towns "is heavily related to the use of C-130's to move" men and materiel. Before he and other foreign correspondents were expelled at gun point from East Pakistan Selig S. Harrison of the Washington Post noted the disturbing fact that: The universal attitude expressed in Dacca by representative Bengalis from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman down to the street vendor is that the United States has wittingly or otherwise made it possible for West Pakistan to ride roughshod over the East through the military assistance to the Punjabi dominated army and an economic aid approach reflecting the bias of the largely West Pakistani bureaucracy. In regard to our military involvement, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch concluded that "the United States must share the guilt in this atrocity." In sum, our military ties with Pakistan has implemented and made possible the carnage. I ask unanimous consent that news-paper articles dealing with our military aid to Pakistan be printed at this point in the Record. There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

From the Washington Post, Mar. 30, 1971 Bengalis See U.S. Role in Rawalpindi Effort By Selig S. Harrison

From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 4, 1971 U.S. Arms in Dacca

From the New York Times, Apr. 10, 1971 United States Continues Aid to Pakistan Army P Ammunition and Parts Sent P American-Supplied Arms May Be in Use in East By Benjamin Welles

From the New York Times, Apr. 14, 1971 U.S. Acknowledges Sales of Ammunition to Pakistan By Benjamin Welles

From the Wall Street Journal, Apr. 5 1971 A Dubious Honor

From the New York Times, Apr. 18, 1971 Keating Report Stirs Pakistanis P Westerners Assail Remarks on the Conflict in East By Eric Pace

From the New York Times, Apr. 18, 1971 Pakistan's Made-in-U.S.A. Arms By Chester Bowles

From the Wall Street Journal, Apr. 5 1971 Pakistan's Plight Bodes III for Nixon's New Higher Foreign Aid Request

From the New York Times, Apr. 25, 1971 Pakistan: Big Powers in a Diplomatic Minuet By Sydney H. Schanberg

From the Washington Post, May 6 1971 U.S.-Aid Tanks used in Pakistan

From the New York Times, May 7, 1971 Senate Unit Asks Pakistan Arms Cutoff By Benjamin Welles

India Appeals on Refugees By Sydney H. Schanberg

Bangla Desh: Situation and Options By Prof. Rahman Sobhan

From the Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1971 Bangla Desh: a Pragmatic Silence By Peter R. Kann

From the Washington Post, May 12, 1971 The Requirements in Pakistan

From the New York Times, May 12, 1971 The Vultures of Bengal

From the (Washington D.C.) Evening Star, May 12, 1971 Aid for East Pakistan

From the Baltimore Sun, May 13, 1971 U.S. Asked Not to Aid Pakistan By Adam Clymer

From the Washington Daily News, May 13, 1971 Aid to Pakistan?

From the New York Times, May 14, 1971 Fulbright Is Said To Rebuff Rogers P Secretary Reportedly Asked Hearing for Pakistani By Benjamin Welles